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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 06-3410
_____________
BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS;
MICHAEL A. SABIA, JR.,
                         Appellants
             v.
GREGORY ROSSI in his individual and official capacity;
JOHN MCNAMARA  in his individual and official capacity;
TOWN OF DOVER, THE 
State of New Jersey, Town Admistratory/Clerk;
ZULIMA V. FARBER State of New Jersey, Attorney General;
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
No. 05-cv-00475
(Honorable William J. Martini)
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 11, 2007
Before: McKEE, CHAGARES,
and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
(Filed:  August 28, 2008)
OPINION OF THE COURT
2McKee, Circuit Judge
The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Michael A. Sabia, Jr. appeal the
district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and
dismissing the complaint which the plaintiffs filed pursuant to The Federal Railway
Safety Act of 1970.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
Inasmuch as we write primarily for the parties who are presumed to be familiar
with this case, we need not recite the factual or procedural background except insofar as
may be helpful to our brief discussion.  
The only issue raised on appeal is whether the district court correctly concluded
that plaintiffs had not established a violation of the Fourth Amendment as a matter of
law.  Plaintiffs maintain here, as they did in the district court, that “particularized
suspicion” that an individual may be impaired by alcohol or drugs is required to support
probable cause for a search warrant for blood and urine.  We have reviewed the very
thoughtful Letter Opinion, dated June 16, 2006, in which the district court succinctly but
thoroughly explains why summary judgement is warranted in this case.  We agree with
the court’s explanation, and little more discussion of plaintiffs’ claims is necessary.
It is now clear that the Fourth Amendment is implicated when law enforcement
attempts to obtain a sample of blood or urine.  Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive’s
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989).  Plaintiffs argue the Fourth Amendment was violated
here because police did not have probable cause to suspect Sabia of wrongdoing.  Rather,
3as the district court explained, police obtained a search warrant for blood and urine
samples  because they needed “to rule out any possibility that the death [of the officer
Sabia struck] was caused by intoxication on the part of Sabia.”  The district court relied
upon Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) in concluding that the warrant
was not obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  In Zurcher, the district court
had concluded that “third-party” searches without probable cause “to believe that the
owner or possessor of the property is himself implicated in the crime . . .,” are only
constitutional in very limited circumstances.  Id. at 554.  In reversing that decision, the
Supreme Court explained: “[n]othing on the face of the Amendment suggests that a
third-party search warrant should not normally issue.  The Warrant Clause speaks of
search warrants issued on ‘probable cause’ and ‘particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.’” Id.  Thus, “[t]he critical element in a
reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there
is reasonable cause to believe that the specific ‘things’ to be searched for and seized are
located on the property for which entry is sought.” Id. at 556.  The object of the warrant
must also constitute contraband or evidence. Here, Sabia’s possible intoxication was
relevant to establishing whether the deceased officer died as a result of an arson, or
because of the intervening cause of Sabia’s intoxication. 
Accordingly, the warrant was based upon probable cause under Zurcher, and the
district court correctly granted summary judgment.
